

# Pivot

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## *Automatic Blackbox Exploit Generation for Stack-Based Buffer Overflows*

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# I am Myrto!

- 1) I graduated from DIT in July, 2025
- 2) I work on the development of energy market platforms, mainly focusing on backend systems.
- 3) As a hobby, I enjoy learning about Linux environments, the Linux kernel, and container technologies
- 4) I consider myself an aspiring systems engineer in the making



# Presentation Overview

→ Why do we need exploit automation?

→ A quick demo

→ Pivot's system internals

# Motivation

**Binary exploitation is hard for human effort alone:**

- Deep system knowledge needed
- Often no source code, must infer behavior via reverse engineering
- Modern mitigations must be bypassed
- Highly case-specific: No universal technique or workflow applies across targets

# Motivation

Binary exploitation remains a major security concern:

- Unsafe coding practices and languages still dominate low-level software
- Too many crashes in public software, too little time to manually audit them
- **Automation** is needed to identify which crashes are truly exploitable

# A common misconception

**vulnerability**

**exploit**

# The misconception in the real world :

```
char filename[PATH_MAX]; // this buffer is 4096 bytes
r = sc_get_cache_dir(card->ctx, filename,
    sizeof(filename) - strlen(fp) - 2);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
    goto err;
strcat(filename, "/");
strcat(filename, fp);
```

Claude Opus 4.6 identified and classified this as a buffer overflow vulnerability in **OpenSC**, an open-source command-line utility.

# The misconception in the real world :

```
if (strlen(fp) != 64) { /* ASCII-HEX encoded SHA-256 */
    r = SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
    goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
    if (isxdigit((unsigned char)fp[i]) == 0) {
        r = SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
        goto err;
    }
}
```

Even though *fp* is not fixed, it is strictly constrained → benign crash → buffer overflow **non-exploitable**

<https://red.anthropic.com/2026/zero-days/>

<https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/blob/master/src/libopensc/card-piv.c#L5168>

[cybersecurity is about to get weird](#)

# The problem:

Many program crashes are **potential exploits** while others are just **benign crashes**.

Is there a way to identify exploitability?

# The goal:

Pivot aims to roughly answer the following question:

*“Is this program exploitable?” \**

\*given a potential buffer overflow and an input that triggers it

**Demo time**

# Exploit eligibility

Reproducing a crash with user input does **not** imply that a program is **exploitable**.


**condition for Exploitability: tainting the EIP register**

For a crash to be transformed into an exploit, it must satisfy the above condition and result in a fault on EIP; typically meaning that control flow reaches the function epilogue.

# Exploit eligibility

...but a crash or simply a segfault can happen on any invalid memory access!


overwriting the stack  $\Rightarrow$  potentially overwriting local pointers



visual representation of a **non-exploit-eligible crash**


# Pivot's approach on Crash Exploration

abstractly...



\*Root Cause Analysis determines whether the provided mutation produces an exploit-eligible crash

# System Diagram



# Evaluation

Pivot got tested under 2 axes:

a) exploration phase

- Number of mutations explored
- State tree depth
- Time taken

result:

- up to 100 mutations were explored per target
- average time under 3 sec

b) exploit phase

- Average number of attempts under ASLR
- Time to successful exploit

result:

- up to 75 attempts per target
- average time under 2 sec

# Assumptions & Limitations

- Target has a **known** crashing input
- Vulnerability triggered via **stdin**, **argv**, or **env var**
- **NX** and **canaries disabled** for full functionality
- Exploitation relies on **shellcode injection** into the **stack**
- **No fuzzing** or bug discovery, input is user-provided
- Strictly **controlled** and defined **environment**

**Thank you for your time!**