

Διάλεξη #4 - Control Flow Hijack Attacks



https://xkcd.com/1353/



Huge thank you to <u>David Brumley</u> from Carnegie Mellon University for the guidance and content input while developing this class

Ανακοινώσεις / Διευκρινίσεις

• Παράταση για την Εργασία #0: 19 Μαρτίου

Την Προηγούμενη Φορά


- 1. x86 Fundamentals
 - Call Return Semantics
- 2. Basics of buffer overflow attacks
 - Live example



Σήμερα

- Control Flow Hijack Attacks
- Basics of buffer overflow attacks continued (shellcode + nopsled)
- x86 Fundamentals continued





I don't care what anything was designed to do, I care about what it can do.

— Gene Kranz —

AZ QUOTES

Terminology: Exploits and Types of Exploits

An *exploit* is an *input* (aka *payload*) that violates the *intended* semantics of the target application.

Method	Objective	
Control Flow Hijack	Gain control of the instruction pointer %rip (%eip)	
Denial of Service	Cause program to crash or stop servicing clients	
Information Disclosure	Leak private information, e.g., saved password	

Control Flow Hijacks (or Remote Code Execution - RCE) are considered to be the worst vulnerabilities a program can have.

Why?

Control Flow Hijack: Always Computation + Control

E.g., buffer overflow (BOF):

computation

+

control

nop-sled

shellcode (aka payload)

&buf

- code injection
- return-to-libc
- GOT overwrite
- heap metadata overwrite
- return-oriented programming

•

Same principle, different mechanism


Shellcode

Traditionally exploits injected assembly instructions for exec("/bin/sh") into buffer.

Data Execution Prevention and other defenses have made this exploitation technique ineffective on consumer commercial OSes for over a decade.

Sadly, this is still applicable in areas like IoT, energy, and so on.

- Considered a basic skill for exploitation (even if not on your latest OS)
- See "Smashing the stack for fun and profit" for one string
- or search online OR write it yourself!



Shellcode Example

Note absence of '\0' byte - why?

Assembly Form
8048060 <_start>:

Binary String Form

08048060 <_start>: "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73" 8048060: 31 c0 %eax,%eax xor "\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89" 8048062: 50 push %eax 8048063: 68 2f 2f 73 68 \$0x68732f2f push "\xe3\x89\xc1\x89\xc2\xb0\x0b" 8048068: 68 2f 62 69 6e \$0x6e69622f push "\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x40\xcd\x80" 804806d: 89 e3 %esp,%ebx mov 804806f: 89 c1 %eax,%ecx mov 8048071: 89 c2 %eax,%edx mov exec("/bin/sh") 8048073: b0 0b \$0xb,%al mov 8048075: cd 80 \$0x80 int %eax,%eax 8048077: 31 c0 xor 8048079: 40 %eax inc \$0x80 804807a: cd 80 int exit()

https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43716

Various Shellcode Databases and Types

https://www.exploit-db.com/, https://shell-storm.org/...

Alphanumeric Shellcode

English Shellcode

Platform Independent Shellcode

Running Shellcode with C


```
#include <stdio.h>
                                                         $ gcc -o shell shell.c -m32
#include <string.h>
                                                         ubuntu@c0ab18986f52:~$ ./shell
                                                         Shellcode length : 28 bytes
int main() {
                                                         Segmentation fault (core dumped)
  char code [] = "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73"
                                                         $ gcc -o shell shell.c -m32 -zexecstack
                                                         ubuntu@c0ab18986f52:~$ ./shell
                  "\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89"
                                                         Shellcode length: 28 bytes
                  "\xe3\x89\xc1\x89\xc2\xb0\x0b"
                  "\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x40\xcd\x80";
  printf ("Shellcode length : %d bytes\n", strlen (code));
  int(*f)()=(int(*)())code;
  f();
                                                          Making stack memory executable is required - why?
  return 0;
```

Tip: Quickly disassemble a byte sequence with: echo -ne "\x31\xc0\x50" | ndisasm -b 32 -

What is a system call?

How do you make a system call as a programmer?

Shellcode



Executing System Calls

- 1. Put syscall number in eax
 - o rax in 64 bit
- 2. Put arguments in ebx, ecx, edx, etc
 - o rdi, rsi, rdx, ... in 64 bit
- 3. Call int 0x80 (syscall)
- 4. System call runs. Result in eax (rax)

execve syscall number is 0xb # address of string "/bin/sh" in ebx, 0 in ecx & edx execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);

How am I supposed to remember all that? You don't! Look it up: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/master/constants/syscalls.md

x86: Two single-byte instructions to remember

\x90: nop instruction. A no-operation (nop for short) instruction is one that does nothing. Useful for exploit development by why-why-would-cpus have such an instruction?

\xcc: int 3 instruction. An interrupt to stop the normal flow of execution and usually how debuggers like gdb implement breakpoints. int 0x80 is two bytes, why did computer architecture people decide to use a single byte for it?

Tip: nop Sleds (or Slides or Ramps)

WARNING:

Environment changes address of buf


\$ OLDPWD=""./vuln

VS.

\$ OLDPWD="aaaa" ./vuln





Pro Tip: Inserting nop's (0x90) into shellcode allows for slack



Probability of Success

Assume a 32-bit system where I'm randomly jumping to the stack. What are the odds I'll succeed in the following two scenarios?







Filling in Stack Gaps

```
int orange(int a, int b)
  char buf[16];
  int c, d;
  if(a > b)
    c = a;
  else
                                               callee
     c = b;
  d = red(c, buf);
  return d;
                                                 values
```


Need to access arguments

Need space to store local vars (buf, c, and d)

Need space to put arguments for

Need a way for callee to return


cdecl – the default for Linux & gcc




←─%ebp (caller)

When orange attains control,


 return address has already been pushed onto stack by caller




- return address has already been pushed onto stack by caller
- 2. own the frame pointer
 - push caller's ebp
 - copy current esp into ebp
 - first argument is at ebp+8




- return address has already been pushed onto stack by caller
- 2. own the frame pointer
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 - first argument is at ebp+8
- 3. save values of other callee-save registers *if used*
 - edi, esi, ebx: via push or mov
 - esp: can restore by arithmetic




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- 3. save values of other callee-save registers *if used*
 - edi, esi, ebx: via push or mov
 - esp: can restore by arithmetic
- 4. allocate space for locals
 - subtracting from esp
 - "live" variables in registers, which on contention, can be "spilled" to stack space







- 1. push any caller-save registers if their values are needed after red returns
 - eax, edx, ecx




- 1. push any caller-save registers if their values are needed after red returns
 - eax, edx, ecx
- push arguments to red from right to left (reversed)
 - from callee's perspective, argument 1 is nearest in stack




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- 3. push return address, i.e., the *next* instruction to execute in orange after red returns



- 1. push any caller-save registers if their values are needed after red returns
 - eax, edx, ecx
- push arguments to red from right to left (reversed)
 - from callee's perspective, argument 1 is nearest in stack
- 3. push return address, i.e., the *next* instruction to execute in orange after red returns
- 4. transfer control to red
 - usually happens together with step 3 using call



 return address has already been pushed onto stack by orange




- return address has already been pushed onto stack by orange
- own the frame pointer

a return addr caller's ebp callee-save locals (buf, c, $d \ge 24$ bytes if stored on stack) caller-save buf C return addr

orange's ebp

- return address has already been pushed onto stack by orange
- 2. own the frame pointer
- 3. ... (red is doing its stuff) ...




- return address has already been pushed onto stack by orange
- own the frame pointer
- ... (red is doing its stuff) ... 3.
- store return value, if any, in eax
- deallocate locals 5.
 - adding to esp
- restore any callee-save registers 6.

a return addr caller's ebp callee-save locals (buf, c, $d \ge 24$ bytes if stored on stack) caller-save buf C return addr


orange's ebp

%ebp and %esp 33


- return address has already been pushed onto stack by orange
- 2. own the frame pointer
- 3. ... (red is doing its stuff) ...
- 4. store return value, if any, in eax
- 5. deallocate locals
 - adding to esp
- 6. restore any callee-save registers
- 7. restore orange's frame pointer
 - pop %ebp



- return address has already been pushed onto stack by orange
- 2. own the frame pointer
- 3. ... (red is doing its stuff) ...
- 4. store return value, if any, in eax
- 5. deallocate locals
 - adding to esp
- 6. restore any callee-save registers
- 7. restore orange's frame pointer
 - pop %ebp
- 8. return control to orange
 - ret
 - pops return address from stack and jumps there




When orange regains control,



When orange regains control,

- 1. clean up arguments to red
 - adding to esp
- 2. restore any caller-save registers
 - pops
- 3. ..



cdecl – One Slide

Action	Notes
caller saves: eax, edx, ecx	push (old), or mov if esp already
arguments pushed right-to-left	adjusted
linkage data starts new frame	call pushes return addr
callee saves: ebx, esi, edi, ebp, esp	ebp often used to deref args and
	local vars
return value	pass back using eax
argument cleanup	caller's responsibility



Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual

Volume 1: Basic Architecture

NOTE: The Intel[®] 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual consists of nine volumes: Basic Architecture, Order Number 253665; Instruction Set Reference A-L, Order Number 253666; Instruction Set Reference V-Z, Order Number 326013; Instruction Set Reference V-Z, Order Number 336013; Instruction Set Reference, Order Number 334569; System Programming Guide, Part 1, Order Number 253668; System Programming Guide, Part 2, Order Number 253669; System Programming Guide, Part 3, Order Number 326019; System Programming Guide, Part 4, Order Number 332831. Refer to all nine volumes when evaluating your design needs.

Order Number: 253665-060US September 2016

64-bit is different, but not by much

Action	Notes
caller saves: rax, rdx, rcx, rsi, rdi, r8-r11	
arguments in rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9, and then stack	call pushes return addr
callee saves: rbx, rbp, r12-r15	rbp often used to deref local vars
return value	pass back using rax
argument cleanup	caller's responsibility

Terminology

 Function Prologue – instructions to set up stack space and save callee saved registers. Typical prologue: push %ebp mov %esp, %ebp

• Function Epilogue - instructions to clean up stack space and restore callee saved registers. Typical epilogue:

```
leave ; equiv to: mov %ebp,%esp; pop %ebp;
ret
```


Stack frames may not look as you'd expect - Tips

Factors affecting the stack frame:

- statically declared buffers may be padded
- what about space for callee-save regs?
- [advanced] what if some vars are in regs only?
- [advanced] what if compiler reorders local variables on stack?

gdb is your friend!(google gdb quick reference)

Use brute force when it makes sense:)



Debugging με GDB

- 1. gcc -g -ggdb -o prog prog.c
- 2. gdb --args ./program arg1 arg2
- 3. run, break, step, continue, finish
- 4. backtrace
- 5. print / x commands
- 6. Cheat Sheet

Ευχαριστώ και καλή μέρα εύχομαι!

Keep hacking!